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Abstract 
Nuclear security culture – an emerging and widely recognized practice – serves as a means to support and 
enhance nuclear security. In fact, many International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and the 
Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the vital role of nuclear security culture and raised its status 
to the same level as physical protection and material accountancy. Consequently, there is a great need to 
include the concept of nuclear security culture and its self-assessment methodology in existing nuclear 
security education and training programs as a cross-cutting topic and as a means to improve the efficiency 
of the currently applied learning methods. This paper outlines the importance of including training 
modules on nuclear security culture and its self-assessment as a way in which to improve and complement 
existing nuclear security education and training programs. 
I. Introduction 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines security culture as “the assembly of 
characteristics, attitudes, and behavior of individuals, organizations, and institutions which serve as a 
means to support and enhance nuclear security” [1]. As a supporting and enhancing practice, the role of 
culture can be deduced from the definition of nuclear security which, according to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is “the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive 
substances or their associated facilities” [2]. Accordingly, the cross-cutting concept of security culture is 
not limited to such basic principles as physical protection and material accountancy, but it also covers a 
much wider playing field including customs and border security, illicit trafficking prevention, and 
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personnel reliability screening and training. The scale, recognition, and visibility of security culture has 
been increasing in momentum for its use not only as a vital component of nuclear security but also as a 
vehicle for reinforcing professional skills and improving motivation. 
 
This paper focuses on the genesis of security culture as a subset of organizational culture and its effect on 
the overall nuclear security regime. It traces the rapid evolution of security culture into the multi-
functional practice supported by assessment and enhancement methodologies, which can serve as a 
supplementary tool to make conventional classroom training more effective and sustainable. 
II. Human Performance and Training Objectives 
Nuclear security education and training have diverse functions, but they are all designed to train the entire 
workforce to carry out their assigned security functions effectively and reliably. Given the cross-cutting 
nature of security and its applicability to all personnel, security culture is a vehicle to improve overall 
human performance at nuclear facilities and associated activity exposed to both inside and outside threats. 
Numerous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications in the Nuclear Security Series 
identify culture as an indispensable element for both strengthening security and improving the quality of 
training. Significantly, “Objectives and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime” 
(Nuclear Security Series #20, 2013) stipulates that each competent authority and authorized person with 
nuclear security responsibilities contribute to the sustainability of the nuclear security regime by 
“developing, fostering and maintaining a robust nuclear security culture” [3]. When organizations set out 
to improve the human component by promoting a security culture, they set out to cultivate relevant habits, 
attitudes, and perceptions among its staff members. 
 
The multi-disciplinary approach in education and training encompasses a variety of managerial, 
organizational, behavioral, and other inputs. There is no need to choose between a technology- centered 
and a human-centered syllabus design. Rather, a commitment to security arises from the interplay among 
technology, culture, and people. These elements cannot be separated from one another in the process of 
training. In other words, a major objective of nuclear security training is to facilitate human interaction 
with technology – both hard and soft, covering procedures and regulations – in security systems with a 
view toward helping staff members recognize problems, identify emergent events, anticipate patterns that 
might lead to a security breach, and, consequently, take appropriate action. The more sophisticated 
security technologies and arrangements are, the more important it is for personnel within the organization 
to be trained in designing, operating, maintaining, and improving these security technologies and 
arrangements. 
III. Need for Differentiated Approach 
While it is safe to assume that most personnel take ownership of nuclear safety, security may give rise to 
divergent views around the workforce and create glitches in the training process. This dichotomy makes 
classroom training both challenging and demanding. A wide range of attitudes toward security requiring a 
differentiated and tailored approach is demonstrated below: 
 
 Ownership: Personnel assume responsibility, regard security as their program, and feel 
accountable for security throughout the organization. 
 Participation: Personnel provide their point of view regarding security, and adopt a more creative 
approach toward security regulations and rules for compliance. 
 Compliance: Personnel follow the rules regardless of whether their compliance contributes to 
better security. 
 Apathy: Personnel do not care one way or the other about security. 
 Avoidance: Personnel regard security as inherently dangerous, unnecessary, or even harmful [4]. 
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The main premise is not what people know or are aware of, but rather, it is what they do after its 
completion, which is guided by their beliefs and attitudes. Unless people understand and believe that there 
is a credible threat and that security is important, some of them are unlikely to personally contribute to 
security despite the availability of carefully developed and user-friendly requirements and procedures. 
 
Beliefs and attitudes are drivers of people’s behavior. Commitments to nuclear security are formed in 
people’s minds over time and become causal factors to both the precursors to security events and also 
influence the response to events. The proper assembly of beliefs and attitudes in combination with an 
appropriate management system leads to an effective nuclear security culture. Without a strong 
substructure of beliefs and attitudes about threats, an effective nuclear security culture cannot exist. 
Efforts to instill such beliefs and attitudes must be carefully calibrated to reach everyone working in the 
facility and not just the organization’s security professionals alone. 
 
Three closely integrated sources of such beliefs and attitudes include (i) leadership, (ii) training, and (iii) 
work experience. Leaders need to lead by example to forge the appropriate patterns of security-related 
perceptions within the staff. The leadership is broken down into two tiers – (1) top leaders and senior 
managers, and (2) managers of all kinds of levels – where distinctly different roles are performed to help 
shape beliefs and attitudes. For example, top leaders typically create visions and strategies, (for instance, 
a sensible picture for the future and logic for how the vision can be achieved), while the managers focus 
tends to be on plans and budgets, (for instance, specific steps and timetables to implement the strategies 
and plans to convert them into reality). A major portion of work experience as a source of nuclear security 
culture comes from efforts to enhance security culture and implement its self-assessment methodologies. 
 
The conventional classroom format has its limitations insofar as effective nuclear security education, and 
training is concerned. The most common defaults include: a minimal personalized approach, a focus on 
generic security requirements rather than specific needs of the organization, and insufficiently 
differentiated curricula to meet requirements of various professional groups. 
 
In order to create effective nuclear security education and training, a creative vision and an updated 
toolset are required. An example would be to include training on security culture and the use of its 
emerging methodologies, with an emphasis on regularly held culture self-assessment, which is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
IV. A New Toolset 
Nuclear security culture emerged as a concept at the turn of the century, and, since then, it has evolved 
into a widely recognized practice. In 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published an 
Implementing Guide on nuclear security culture as part of its Nuclear Security Series [5]. The guide 
defines the concept and characteristics of nuclear security culture while describing the roles and 
responsibilities of institutions and individuals entrusted with a function in the security regimes. Since 
then, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted over 25 international, regional, and 
national workshops to promote security culture and to train nuclear security personnel at all levels. 
 
Since then, two draft Technical Guidance documents – “Self-Assessment of Nuclear Security Culture in 
Facilities and Activities” and “Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture in Facilities and Activities” – are 
currently under development, and are expected to be released in 2016-2017. The draft self-assessment 
methodologies have been successfully applied in three countries and at three different facilities: 
Indonesia’s research reactors (2012-2013), Bulgaria’s nuclear power plant (2014), and at a hospital for 
radioactive sources in Malaysia (2014-2016). The results of these self-assessment exercises were 
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submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical meetings as well as to international 
conferences. 
 
Furthermore, all four Nuclear Security Summits (Washington, D.C., 2010, Seoul, 2012, The Hague, 2014, 
and Washington, D.C., 2016) significantly boosted the concept and practical application of nuclear 
security culture. One important innovation was raising its status of security culture to the same level of 
importance as physical protection and material accountancy. The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, for 
example, encouraged all relevant stakeholders to build and sustain a strong nuclear culture to effectively 
combat nuclear terrorism and other criminal threats. Another step forward in promoting the concept was 
its emphasis on the need to focus on the safety-security interface. 
 
Self-assessment is a multistage process comprising interactive methods (individual interviews, focus 
group discussion, and to some extent observation) and non-interactive methods (survey, document 
review, and again observation). It is a process that focuses on the characteristics of behavior and 
management systems (of which there are a total of 30 characteristics). These characteristics are evaluated 
by comparing what the culture is at present to their optimal parameters specified by culture indicators 
assigned to each characteristic as benchmarks. Due to the heavy focus on beliefs and assumptions, there 
are many benefits to regularly conducting self- assessments. First, they help personnel understand the 
reasons for an organization’s pattern of behaviors in certain circumstances; second, they devise optimal 
security arrangements; and, third, they predict how the workforce may react to a wide range of risks. 
 
In addition to evaluating security culture, self-assessment exercises can perform a valuable educational 
and training function similarly to on-the-job-training. Below are examples of why and how security 
culture self-assessment can help to move organizations along in its learning curve and supplement 
conventional classroom practices: 
 
 Preparation for the self-assessment process highlights the importance of nuclear security 
throughout the organization. Usually, senior management is seen as having initiated and 
supported the process. The head of the organization releases a directive stating the assessment’s 
purpose, outlining the procedure for carrying it out, and explaining how the results will be used. 
 Surveys and interviews involve a major portion for the workforce who is no longer in the position 
of passive observers in the classroom. Those selected for surveys are supposed to grade survey 
statements (which are based on security culture indicators listed in relevant IAEA publications) 
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” This assignment gives participants a chance for self-
reflection and encourages them to understand the meaning of culture indicators in the context of 
their organizations. As to the number of people involved, in the course of the 2012-2013 self-
assessment at Indonesia’s three research reactors, 624 people were surveyed (60 percent of the 
workforce) and 128 people interviewed (12 percent of the workforce). A total number of 
employees at the three sites was 1,035. 
 Though culture indicators listed in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications are 
mostly generic, self- assessment teams at each organization are encouraged either to adjust them 
to their needs or develop their own indicators consistent with the profiles of these organizations. 
As a result, survey respondents can clearly see how their provisions fit into their security regimes. 
Moreover, since most indicators apply to the entire organizations, it is recommended to 
personalize them and to focus on strictly individual attitudes. Accordingly, the culture indicator 
“Organization’s instructions on security are easy to follow because they are clear, up-to-date, 
readily available, and user-friendly” can be changed to the following personalized survey 
statement: “It is easy for me to follow instructions for security because they are clear, up-to-date, 
readily available, and user-friendly.” Expressions of personal views from respondents not only 
facilitate the search for cultural root causes but also reinforces and expands their knowledge. 
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 Interviews allow for personal contact between an interviewer and a respondent, ideally for 
starting an unconstrained flow of information and providing a chance for respondents to review 
their own role in the security regime. An experienced interviewer may be in a position to identify 
gaps in the ongoing security training and later recommend adjustments and updates to the 
program. 
 The self-assessment process culminates in a final document summarizing the findings, setting the 
foundation for communicating key message, and providing the baseline for subsequent self-
assessment(s). A major purpose of the report submitted to the management for sharing with the 
organization is to foster a sense of ownership among the staff. This makes each person in the 
organization a joint custodian of the security culture. The final communication phase acclimates 
senior management and the entire organization to the role of the human factor in security, which, 
in turn, helps them learn lessons and encourages them to improve professional skills. It is 
important to stress that the self-assessment findings should be debated rather than simply 
published in a report. 
 The challenge for practitioners is how to combine self-assessments and traditional training in a 
way to raise the effectiveness of both in a mutually complementary manner. For example, a self-
assessment of security culture can be preceded by a classroom training session to explain and 
discuss, among other topics, the meaning of culture indicators used for surveys, interviews or 
focus group discussion. On the other hand, before recommending a focus for self-assessment, the 
management or self-assessment team should review the records and syllabi of the most recent 
nuclear security training sessions to identify a match. The objective would be to emphasize to the 
extent possible those issues, which were covered by those sessions and complement the 
classroom experience with practical insights. 
 
Upon completion of the self-assessment exercise at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, the 
head of the self-assessment team concluded: “In general, the self-assessment appears to be an excellent 
addition to the regular security training which includes involvement of staff as well as collecting 
information for current security culture level. The involvement of staff is very positive for the training, 
which not only motivates the employees but also gives a real-time feedback for their progress and for the 
current state of the security regime” [6]. 
V. Conclusions 
Security culture and its self-assessment methodology must be seen in their broadest context as both an 
evaluation tool and an individual skills enhancer. All elements of nuclear infrastructure, including fuel 
cycle facilities, research reactors, manufacturers and users of radioactive sources, and transport 
companies, must be secure. Once instituted, this methodology will not only facilitate identification of 
vulnerabilities but also help transform the human factor from a problem to be overcome into an asset to 
strengthen security. 
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